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Abstract
Credit rationing is a common phenomenon faced by firms, 
one that has negative implications for long- term invest-
ments. In Brazil, public credit plays a key role in support-
ing firms: state- owned banks account for almost half of the 
outstanding credit. Public credit programmes aim at reduc-
ing credit restrictions, increasing competitiveness and job 
creation for small and medium enterprises. This article ana-
lyzes the effectiveness of the credit lines managed by two 
main public institutions in Brazil. Results show that access 
to public credit lines has a significant positive impact on 
firms’ employment growth and exports, while no effect 
was found on wage differential. The impact on exports is 
driven by the increase in volumes among exporting firms 
rather than the probability of becoming an exporter.
K E Y W O R D S
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Firms’ access to credit is crucial, due to its potential to spur market development and entrepreneurial 
innovation (Schumpeter, 1961). Asymmetric information and transaction costs are usually the main 
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drivers of this credit rationing. Given the difficulty of obtaining information about a client’s ability 
and willingness to repay a loan, financial entities cannot adequately calculate the risks of lending to 
said client and abstain from participating in the market, to charge interest rates that bear no relation 
to the client’s solvency level, or to demand substantial collateral, which represents a constraint for the 
client. Brazilian firms are no exception to this problem. In fact, the lack of publicly available infor-
mation about small and medium enterprises (SMEs) is one of the main reasons small businesses face 
insufficient access to credit (Bass & Schrooten, 2006). As such, large firms often have easier access 
to financing than SMEs. The additional costs associated with the collection of relevant information 
of SMEs lead to high interest rates and potential differences in loan characteristics. In Brazil, two key 
institutions – the Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento (BNDES) and the Financiadora de Estudos 
e Projectos (FINEP, Brazil’s innovation finance agency) – developed specific public credit lines to 
channel credit to SMEs.
Discussions of the role of the public sector in the banking system are not new. Gerschenkron (1962) 
was one of the first to argue that, without public participation, the lack of trust among creditors and 
debtors would inhibit credit markets and thus long- term projects. Amsden (2001) and Armendáriz de 
Aghion (1999) contend that private banks underinvest in the expertise required to assess and promote 
new industries in the long run. More recently, Mazzucato and Penna (2016) posit that the problem is 
not only that markets could be working incorrectly, but that in some cases markets do not even exist. 
They further claim that mission- oriented projects aim to create new technological landscapes and 
solutions to fulfil the governmental mission.
According to Bruck (1998) and Levy- Yeyati, Micco, and Panizza (2004) in this industrial political 
view, state- owned development banks specialize in providing long- term capital and lending to firms 
that could not otherwise undertake projects. Public credit programmes carried out by state- owned 
development banks have been the main avenue of credit to finance firms not only in Latin America, 
but in developed and developing countries (Aronovich & Fernandes, 2006; Rodrik, 2004). Examples 
include Brazil’s BNDES, Germany’s KfW, the Korean Development Bank, the Japan Development 
Bank, the Canadian Development Bank (now the Business Development Bank of Canada) and the 
China Development Bank.1
In Brazil, public credit plays an important role in supporting the productive sector. The BNDES 
was founded in 1952 as an institutional innovation in the Brazilian banking system filling an important 
gap: the provision of long- term loans for investment in manufacturing and infrastructure projects. In 
the 1980s, the focus of the Brazilian government was on the development of financial instruments for 
new ventures and SMEs (while also helping a number of companies facing difficulties due to the 
Brazilian debt crisis); in the 1990s, the focus shifted from specific programmes to finance innovation 
and high- tech firms. In the last decade, the Brazilian government enlarged its operational scope to 
include mission- oriented innovation. One of its defined missions has been to address the challenge of 
increasing expenditures in research and development (R&D). As Mazzucato and Penna (2015) 
 describe, BNDES and FINEP are the main public agencies in Brazil through which funds are chan-
nelled. Data show that the presence of these public agencies in the Brazilian banking sector is high. 
1Since the mid- 1950s, Germany’s KfW has channelled funds for the promotion of long- term growth and infrastructure, pro-
viding finance for SMEs. In the 1960s, the Japan Development Bank began promoting the development of heavy industry 
and infrastructure, shifting their focus to financing technological development and innovation. The Canadian Development 
Bank seeks to promote innovation by providing capital assistance to firms with a special emphasis on SMEs. The Korean 
Development Bank, which was founded to supply capital and assist local industries after the Korean War, also targets the de-
velopment of new sectors and technologies, such as electronics and the automotive industry. Finally, the China Development 
Bank, founded in 1994, focuses on regional economic development and industrial catching- up, supporting and nurturing new 
ventures.
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The largest state- owned development bank – the BNDES – accounted for 11% of all outstanding credit 
in 2006. Considering that the state also owns two of the three largest commercial banks in Brazil, the 
total percentage of outstanding credit accounted for by state- owned banks comes to around 44%. 
Although the importance of the public sector in the Brazilian financial system has been broadly de-
bated, little has been said about the effectiveness of these policy instruments in improving the condi-
tions of final beneficiaries of these resources. The closest reference to our study is Lazzarini, 
Musacchio, Bandeira- de- Mello, and Marcon (2015), in which the authors analyze the effect of loans 
and equity instruments of BNDES on 286 Brazilian firms using data from the Sao Paulo Stock 
Exchange.2 However, their focus is on the impact on profitability and investment: they find that 
BNDES’s loans and equity allocation do not have a consistent effect on profitability, market valuation 
or investment decisions. These results should be taken with caution, since the authors focus on a sam-
ple of firms traded on the stock exchange, which by their nature tend to be larger and less financially 
constrained than the overall population of firms receiving BNDES loans.
Our article contributes to this discussion by shedding light on the effectiveness of public credit 
programmes in promoting the performance of the Brazilian productive sector. In particular, we focus 
on the impact of the credit lines managed by BNDES and FINEP in fostering firms’ employment, 
labour exports and wage differential. For this analysis we exploit a unique micro- level panel data set 
compiled by the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), which includes information on 
both firm- level performances and access to public credit lines for more than 231,000 firms. Our esti-
mation strategy is based on a difference- in- differences methodology with quasi- experimental methods 
to control for selection bias when estimating the impact of the public credit lines.
Our results consistently show that access to public credit lines has a significant and robust positive 
impact on employment growth and exports, even as we do not find evidence of a significant effect on our 
measure of wage differential. Interestingly, our findings suggest that the impact on exports is driven by 
the increase in export volumes among exporting firms, while no significant effect on the probability of 
becoming an exporter is detected. Contrary to Lazzarini et al. (2015), our study finds a positive effect of the 
public credit policy effect of BNDES’s loans. However, as previously mentioned, caution needs to be taken 
when comparing both studies since Lazzarini et al. (2015) analyze different outcomes and, most impor-
tantly, have a smaller sample size with larger firms. Interestingly enough, they also find that BNDES loans 
are not systematically channelled to underperforming firms, which could be consistent with our findings.
This article contributes to the literature by providing further evidence of the effectiveness of public 
credit programmes for Brazilian firms. In doing so, we further discuss our scope and findings along-
side the most recent literature. Our analysis provides relevant answers for the policy- making in Brazil 
of public credit programmes, when the focus is on improving firm performance.
The article is structured as follows: section one provides a brief review on the justification of public 
credit programmes aimed at fostering firm performances and on the evidence of these programmes’ 
effectiveness. Section two discusses in greater detail the main characteristics of public credit pro-
grammes in Brazil, with particular emphasis on the credit lines managed by BNDES and FINEP. 
Section three describes the data used in our analysis, including a review of the main basic statistics 
of interest. Section four discusses our identification strategy, focusing on the approach we adopted 
2Other related studies include Pereira (2007) and Torres Filho and Pimentel Puga (2006). However, these authors mainly ana-
lyze the effect of BNDES loans on beneficiary firms, without a counterfactual analysis. Ottaviano and Lage de Souza (2008) 
measure the impact of BNDES funds use on the value added per worker using the annual industrial survey (Pesquisa Industrial 
Annual (PIA) from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE)). Their results – based on 9,000 firms – suggest 
that firms that contracted loans with BNDES experienced higher labour productivity only after two or three years, compared 
to firms that never contracted loans with the bank over a 10- year period. But the positive result appears only for firms that 
contracted large loans.
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to control for selection biases. Section five presents the results of our estimations, while section six 
concludes and provides some policy recommendations.
2 |  DISCUSSION ON POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF 
CREDIT PROGRAMMES
That informational asymmetries generate credit constraints appears to be a consensus in the literature, at 
least since Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) who state that credit rationing tends to appear in the form of higher 
interest rates (with a potential adverse selection problem), smaller loan sizes (to prevent greater risk) 
and larger collaterals. In turn, the fact that financial constraints may hinder firm performance has also 
been well studied. For instance, poor access to financial markets may negatively affect firm growth, 
especially among small firms (Beck, Demirgüç- Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2005). Rendón (2000) shows 
that capital market imperfections may restrict the creation of permanent jobs, and notes the importance 
of removing financial constraints to promote job creation, particularly in economies with a high propor-
tion of small firms. Moreover, the lack of access to credit may prevent firms from exporting, since this 
practice involves entry costs associated with acquiring information about foreign markets, customizing 
products to fit local tastes and setting up distribution networks (Minetti & Zhu, 2011). Bellone, Musso, 
Nesta, and Schiavo (2010) argue that, in this context, public intervention can help efficient, but finan-
cially constrained, firms to overcome these fixed entry costs and expand their activities abroad.
Thus, in the presence of credit rationing, public financing may be an effective alternative to boost 
firm performance.3 The discussion of the role of the public sector in the banking system goes back at 
least to Gerschenkron (1962), who argues that without public participation, the lack of trust among 
creditors and debtors inhibits credit markets and thus long- term projects. Using a formal model, 
Armendáriz de Aghion (1999) argues that private banks underinvest in the expertise required to assess 
and promote new industries in the long run. Amsden (1989) argues that it is not only a matter of long- 
run capital availability, but that public credit financing also serves as a mechanism by which to screen 
good private projects and to enhance the execution of investments. More recently, Mazzucato and 
Penna (2016) suggest that the problem is not only that markets could be working incorrectly, but that 
in some cases markets do not exist at all. They further claim that mission- oriented projects are con-
cerned with creating new technological landscapes and providing solutions to fulfil the governmental 
mission. Finally, according to Bruck (1998) and Levy- Yeyati et al. (2004), within this industrial polit-
ical view, public credit programmes finance long- term capital and lending to firms that could not 
undertake projects due to the non- existence of long- term funding.
In fact, several empirical studies show that public credit is successful in relaxing financial con-
straints. For instance, Aivazian and Santor (2008) find that the World Bank’s Small and Medium 
Industries programme in Sri Lanka led to a relaxation of credit constraints and higher levels of invest-
ment for firms that received the subsidies. This effect is, however, rather limited, despite the relatively 
large amount of resources committed to this purpose. They also find that the public guarantee sub-
stantially lowered the SMEs’ borrowing cost. Banerjee and Duflo (2014) exploit the exogenous vari-
ation generated by a policy change in India to test whether firms are credit constrained based on their 
reaction to changes in directed lending programmes. According to the authors, while both constrained 
3The rationale behind these public credit programmes is that only credit constrained firms will have access to those loans. 
Presumably, if a firm is not credit constrained, this additional liquidity could be used to substitute other sources of credits. If 
this is the case, there might not be any detectable effect in terms of our outcome variables. However, that would only bias our 
results downward.
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and unconstrained firms may be willing to absorb all the directed credit that they can get, constrained 
firms will use such credit to expand production, while unconstrained firms will primarily use it as a 
substitute for other borrowing. Their findings reveal that credit is used to finance more production, 
which implies an increase in the rate of growth of sales and profits; this provides evidence both of the 
existence of credit constraints and of the possibility of mitigating them through public credit.
Using firm level data, Bach (2008) analyzes whether the French loan programme Compte pour le 
Développement Industriel (CODEVI) succeeded in improving access to credit for small French firms. 
The results show that access to the financing subsidy substantially increased debt financing on the 
firm side. However, this did not lead to significant substitution between subsidized and unsubsidized 
financing channels, which can be taken as evidence of financial constraints. Finally, a close reference 
to our study is Lazzarini et al. (2015), where the authors analyze the effect of loans and equity instru-
ments of BNDES on 286 Brazilian firms using data from the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange. Results show 
that BNDES’s loans and equity allocation do not have a consistent effect on profitability, market val-
uation or investment decisions. These results run contrary to expectation, but should be taken with 
caution since these authors focus on a sample of firms traded on the stock exchange, which by their 
nature tend to be larger and less financially constrained than the overall population of firms receiving 
BNDES loans. Furthermore, the authors warn that although their results are inconsistent with the view 
that sees public credit as a mechanism to unlock productive investments, they do not find enough ev-
idence to support the opposing perspective of public banks as a tool to help and rescue failed firms.4 
In fact, Lazzarini et al. (2015) conclude that the most apparent problem with their sample of firms 
traded on the stock exchange is that they are not changing their investment decisions conditional on 
the new loans, probably because large firms could fund their projects with other sources of capital.
Regarding the effectiveness of credit programmes on firm performance, to our knowledge none 
of the extant studies rely on experimental designs. Instead, the empirical strategy is based on quasi- 
experimental methodologies that aim at mitigating selection biases that are pervasive in this context, 
since participation depends both on administrative eligibility criteria and individual decisions of the 
firms. The most common approach consists of applying difference- in- differences methods to a panel 
combined with matching techniques to ensure the similarity between participants and non- participants.
In a related survey, Hall and Maffioli (2008) offer a review of empirical evaluations in Latin 
America. According to the authors, studies reveal generally positive effects of credit programmes 
on intermediate outcomes like R&D expenditures, worker training, and the introduction of new pro-
cesses and quality control practices, especially in developing countries. However, the evidence of their 
effectiveness on longer- term performance outcomes like sales growth, exports, employment, labour 
productivity and total factor productivity (TFP) is mixed. For instance, Chudnovski, López, Rossi, and 
Ubfal (2005) analyze the Fondo Tecnológico Argentino (FONTAR) in Argentina, a programme aiming 
at improving R&D and technology development through matching grants. They find positive effects 
of 57% to 79% on innovation investment, but find no significant impacts on labour productivity or new 
product sales. Similarly, for the case of Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Tecnológico da Empresa Nacional 
(ADTEN), a subsidy programme for R&D and technological development in Brazil, De Negri, Borges 
Lemos, and De Negri (2006) find R&D expenditures increase by 50% to 90%, but identify no corre-
sponding impact on sales, employment or labour productivity. Benavente, Crespi, and Maffioli (2007) 
study the Chilean Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Tecnológico y Productivo (FONTEC), designed to 
promote technology transfer and development and R&D support. The authors estimate a 40% increase 
in sales growth and 3% increase in export intensity, although they find no impact on labour produc-
tivity in Chile.
4It could therefore be argued that these authors suggest a different form of credit misallocation with state- owned banks.
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Building on these results, Lopez- Acevedo and Tan (2010) provide a review of SME credit pro-
grammes in Mexico (Nafinsa, Bancomext, CONACyT, STPS and other programmes from the Ministry 
of Economy), Chile (SENCE, CORFO, PROCHILE, FONDEF), Colombia (FOMIPYME), and Peru 
(BONOPYME, PROMPYME, CITE). The authors report positive gains in sales, labour productiv-
ity and employment in Chile, and higher value added, sales, export and employment in Mexico. In 
Colombia, the results suggest positive effects on exports, investment in R&D and TFP. Finally, in 
Peru, the findings show significant positive effects in sales and profits. Confirming the findings of 
Hall and Maffioli (2008), Lopez- Acevedo and Tan (2010) notice that some of the estimated effects 
take several years to materialize. Thus, they claim that the lack of impact of previous studies may be 
due to the short time range of the available databases, and emphasize the importance not only of con-
trolling for potential selection biases but also accounting for time lags to correctly estimate the effects 
of credit programmes. Finally, based on the Pesquisa Industrial Anual (PIA) database from Instituto 
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), Ottaviano and Lage de Souza (2008) find no overall 
causal effect of BNDES Finem (Financing and Enterprises) R&D loans on TFP. However, the authors 
argue that some association could be established.
3 |  PUBLIC CREDIT PROGRAMMES IN BRAZIL
One important aspect of Latin American financial markets is that firms are likely to be credit con-
strained and to rely too heavily on their own sources to finance investment (Galindo & Schiantarelli, 
2003; Izquierdo, Micco and Olivera, 2005). For instance, using data from Doing Business from the 
World Bank, approximately 25% of firms consider themselves credit constrained in Colombia. In 
Brazil, using the Doing Business data from 2000–2003, Bond, Soderbon, and Wu (2007) estimate that 
about 40% of firms are credit constrained. This has detrimental implications for aggregate investment 
levels. Furthermore, Najberg, Pimentel Puga, and de Souza Oliveira (2000) argue that small busi-
nesses in Brazil operate with very elastic demand, facing high levels of competition, and usually lack 
managerial and investment resources to reach operational sustainability in the long run. Due to their 
fragile situation and elastic demand, many small firms need external financing to operate their busi-
ness in the short run (Tasic, 2005).
Various factors contribute to generating credit constraints for micro, small and medium enterprises 
(MSMEs). From the demand side, these include their size, a lack of collateral and their technical de-
ficiencies in managing and/or implementing sustainable investment projects. From the supply side, 
factors include limited medium- and long- term sources of funding in the domestic market and a lack 
of transparency and information to conduct proper credit risk assessments. The latter, in particular, 
reduces the appetite of banks to serve this specific market segment. Under this scenario, institutions 
such as BNDES in Brazil or Bancóldex in Colombia, with their access to domestic and foreign re-
sources of medium- and long- term funding, would most certainly be easing credit constraints, improv-
ing investment levels and generating a more efficient allocation.
The main objective of public credit programmes is to support increased competitiveness and job 
creation in SMEs by channelling medium- and long- term financing for investments. Programme funds 
are typically used to finance fixed investments or permanent working capital associated with the exe-
cution of investment projects by qualifying SMEs. In Brazil, while BNDES is not the only source of 
public credit, it does represent one of the biggest outlays for machinery and equipment acquisition, 
accounting for 20% of all credit demand in the economy and 5% of GDP.5 Many other public banks, 
5BNDES finances 25% of all investment in manufacturing and infrastructure.
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such as regional development banks, act only as financial intermediaries to BNDES. For example, the 
other two large public banks, Banco do Brasil and Caixa, provide primarily agriculture credit and 
housing credit, respectively.6
BNDES was founded in 1952 as an institutional innovation in the Brazilian banking system to fill 
an important gap: the provision of long- term loans for investment in manufacturing and infrastructure 
projects. Prior to this, the shortage of long- term bank loans was considered one of the most important 
barriers for economic development. Fully controlled by the Brazilian government, today BNDES 
is one of the largest development banks in the world. It offers many different credit lines, including 
export credit (BNDES- Exim), equity acquisition (Finem and BNDESPar) and machinery acquisition 
(Finame, Finame Leasing and BNDES Automático). Each line has its own lending policies that influ-
ence the interest rates charged. According to Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014), during the 1990s and 
2000s the bank’s equity business became its most profitable business line, helping Brazilian firms to 
finance capital investments when financial markets were still shallow. These credit lines are currently 
focused on supporting the discovery and the implementation of promising projects. BNDES (2015) 
reports that around 60% of the bank’s total loans target firms with annual revenues above $130 million.
BNDES loans have two important characteristics. First, BNDES loans are long term, generally up 
to 60 months. This is much longer than the duration of private sector credit in Brazil, which focuses 
almost exclusively on the short term. As documented by the OECD (2011), private banks have tradi-
tionally been unwilling to provide long- term funding and instead prefer to invest in relatively high- 
yield short- term assets.7 The second characteristic is a favourable interest rate, relative to the cost of 
credit in Brazil. Segura- Ubiergo (2012) documents that until 2012 the interest rate on private market 
business loans in Brazil ranged between 30% and 50% per year. These figures are among the highest 
of any economy in the world.8 In contrast, BNDES funds have a three component cost: (1) the base 
interest rate, (2) the funding and credit risk spread, and (3) the financial intermediary spread. The 
main component is the base interest rate, known as the TJLP (Taxa de Juros de Longo Prazo, the 
Portuguese for ‘federal long- term interest rate’), a government regulated long- term rate. The funding 
and credit risk spread is a component that varies by firm location, firm size and sector. The last part 
of interest rate charges depends on whether it is a large project or not (more than seven million 
Brazilian reals (R$) until 2004 and R$10 million after 2004).
Large projects are evaluated by BNDES itself (direct operations, operações diretas) and other 
projects are handled by financial intermediaries. As BNDES is a bank with no branches, it channels 
credit through regular and regional development banks.9 Furthermore, guarantees are required to ac-
cess BNDES funding. In general, guarantees presented cover 130% of the loan value. Frequently, 
BNDES has temporary ownership of the equipment (garantia fiduciária) during the loan duration.10
6Additionally, FINEP is the Brazilian innovation agency, and provides public financing specifically for research and develop-
ment projects for the entire science, technology and innovation system.
7This feature is not necessarily unique to Latin America, where thin markets for long- term bank finance are fairly common. 
More details can be found in OECD (2011).
8In such an environment a common criticism was that BNDES provided credit to productive sectors of the economy charging 
below market interest rates (Prochnik & Machado, 2008; Lazzarini et al., 2015).
9Banks can also access BNDES funding and offer it to consumers. These funding sources are earmarked to machine acquisition 
or the specific credit line from BNDES and are marketed to the public as such. Credit risk is borne by the banks, as BNDES pay-
ments are not linked with firm loan defaults. Banks are also free to use their own credit scoring methods. In direct operations, 
the credit risk spread is 0.5% (medium and small firms are exempt since 2006). For loans through financial intermediaries, the 
spread is unlimited, but most operations use a 4% cap. This 4% cap allows the loan to qualify for a federal credit guarantee fund 
(FGPC) criteria.
10There are also fixed costs to apply for BNDES credit. The fixed costs can range from 1.0% to 2.0% of loan value in adminis-
trative costs and there is a 0.2% non- refundable application fee.
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4 |  DATA DESCRIPTION
For this study we exploit the richness of a unique panel data set that combines existing administra-
tive and statistical information.11 Hence, the database is an unbalanced panel containing annual firm 
level information from 1997 to 2007. The main source of information is the Relação Anual de 
Informações Sociais (RAIS), an administrative file maintained by the Brazilian Ministry of 
Employment and Labour (Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego – MTE). Each year, all registered tax- 
paying establishments must send information to the Ministry on every worker who had been employed 
by the establishment anytime during the reference year. The RAIS provides a matched employer–em-
ployee longitudinal data set, similar to those available in developed countries. The novelty differential 
of these data is to combine the matched employer–employee structure with detailed information avail-
able on workers’ occupation, wages and schooling. Thus, the main use of RAIS will be to provide the 
labour inputs variables as well as reliable information regarding the value of total exports of firms. 
The coverage of this database includes all firms that declare having hired workers in Brazil since 1996. 
For instance, in 2001, this represented more than 76 million workers declared in more than 230,000 
firms from a variety of sectors. The panel data information allows classifying firms by activity, size, 
age of the firm, and region of activity.
Finally, to capture the beneficiaries of public credit in Brazilian firms, we benefitted from a novel 
database of public credit use compiled by the IPEA. This database has the foremost advantage of en-
abling a cross- reference of information using the unique firm identifier number (Cadastro Nacional de 
Pessoa Jurídica – CNPJ) of each firm with other databases at the firm level in Brazil. This information 
was available on an annual basis from 1997 to 2007.
There are two primary advantages of using a database with the characteristics described above. First, 
the large number of observations (firms) makes it statistically feasible to find firms that did not partici-
pate in the programme with similar characteristics to the ones that actually did (counterfactual). Second, 
the panel data structure allows for the controlling for non- observable effects that determine programme 
participation and firm performance. Nevertheless, the main disadvantage is that the RAIS database does 
not report information regarding total sales, and hence it is not possible to construct TFP measures. 
Still, it can be argued that total salary expenditure and total exports have a close relationship with firms’ 
TFP. In principle, from basic production theory, a real wage indicator should be a measure of labour 
productivity. However, there are many arguments that challenge this view: for instance, the existence 
of collective wage agreements, special benefits for years worked in the firm, the existence of efficiency 
wages or the size of the firm. An interesting methodological suggestion given by Geary and Stark (2002) 
and Enflo, Henning, and Schön (2014) is the use of wage differentials as a proxy for labour productivity 
rather than average productivity measures. With this in mind, we construct a (standardized) measure of 
firms’ wage differential, and we will follow the aforementioned authors to interpret it as an imperfect 
proxy for labour productivity at the firm level. Appendix 1 describes the construction of this variable.
Given the nature of the data and the fact that public credit programmes have been in place since 
before 1997, we needed to decide which year should represent the starting point for our analysis. In 
other words, these programmes would have been in place for years before the first year of the sample 
we consider (1997), and remain active throughout the entire sample. In order to evaluate the effective-
ness of such an intervention, we need to consider an alternative starting point for the programmes. 
This decision is far from trivial and inevitably involves some discretion, but such a simplification 
should lead to an underestimation of the long- run effects of the use of public credit in Brazil. Assuming 
this caveat and its consequences, we decided to consider 2001 as the alternative starting point based 
11The details and definitions of the variables used in the empirical analysis are explained in Appendix I.
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primarily on a statistical argument.12 Thus, all the firms that enter the programme before or after 2001 
were excluded from the analysis. The decision is based on the fact that dividing the sample evenly at 
2001 maximizes the statistical power of the analysis by placing an equal number of years before and 
after the chosen starting year. Needless to say, we interpret our results as a first, and therefore prelim-
inary, analysis of the impact of such a programme.13
5 |  BASELINE CHARACTERISTICS
Table 1 shows that, in 2001, public credit use comprises almost 17,000 firms, of which 23% were ex-
porters. Almost a third of the beneficiary firms are producers of food and plastic, mainly concentrated 
in the south and south- east region. The vast majority (80%) of such firms are micro and small sized.
12Considering alternative starting years does not change significantly our results.
13The effectiveness of public programmes could potentially depend on external factors that may vary with time. With this in mind, 
we made sure not to select a period particularly problematic for private lenders, since that could potentially bias our estimates.
T A B L E  1  Descriptive statistics
Treated Controls
Number Distribution Number Distribution
Firms 16,700 100% 215,183 100%
Exporters 3,786 23% 6,963 3%
Non- exporters 12,914 77% 208,220 97%
Sectors:
Coal extraction 9 0% 80 0%
Oil and natural gas extraction 3 0% 141 0%
Metallic mineral extraction 26 0% 246 0%
Non- metallic mineral extraction 613 4% 4,396 2%
Foods and beverages 2,826 17% 31,725 15%
Tobacco 10 0% 131 0%
Textile 693 4% 8,440 4%
Clothing and accessories 600 4% 33,971 16%
Leather 412 2% 9,830 5%
Wood products 1,030 6% 14,080 7%
Paper products 372 2% 2,300 1%
Edition and printing 611 4% 14,391 7%
Petroleum refining 86 1% 129 0%
Chemical products 798 5% 6,430 3%
Rubber and plastic 1,727 10% 7,665 4%
Manufacture of non- metallic 
minerals
1,309 8% 16,696 8%
Basic metals 510 3% 4,173 2%
Manufacture of metal products 1,584 9% 20,874 10%
(Continued)
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In Table 2 we present summary statistics for the outcomes and covariate variables prior to the be-
ginning of the programme in 2001, for beneficiaries and non- beneficiaries of public credit. It can be 
seen that beneficiaries have systematically larger magnitudes in all variables (employment, total wage 
expenditure, total exports, total imports, total age of the firm, average credit size and average standard-
ized wage) and their difference with non- beneficiaries is strongly significant.14 The information pre-
sented here is consistent with the previous Table and suggests that on average, firms that enter the 
programme are larger in size, spend more in wages, export and import more, are mature, take more 
public credit and have a higher average standardized wage. In fact, this could be reflecting the pres-
ence of unobserved factors affecting the participation decision. The identification strategy, explained 
below, will take into consideration these issues to find appropriate control firms and avoid biases 
generated by these unobserved factors.
14Appendix 1 presents a description of the variables used and its construction.
Treated Controls
Number Distribution Number Distribution
Machinery and equipment 1,205 7% 8,378 4%
Computer equipment 31 0% 420 0%
Electric machinery and equipment 301 2% 2,927 1%
Electronics 99 1% 1,294 1%
Medical equipment and precision 
instruments
138 1% 1,591 1%
Fabrication and assembly of 
automotive vehicles
456 3% 3,075 1%
Manufacture of transport 
equipment
48 0% 952 0%
Furniture 1,156 7% 20,028 9%
Recycling 47 0% 820 0%
Regions:
North 385 2% 5,645 3%
North- east 3,425 21% 52,297 24%
South- east 6,593 39% 82,592 38%
South 5,667 34% 62,000 29%
West 630 4% 12,649 6%
Size (employment):
Micro (<5) 2,151 13% 121,013 56%
Small (5–100) 11,148 67% 90,427 42%
Medium (100–500) 2,627 16% 3,293 2%
Large (>500) 774 5% 450 0%
Multinational:
No 16,190 97% 213,409 99%
Yes 510 3% 1,774 1%
T A B L E  1  (Continued)
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Furthermore, when inspecting the trends of the main outcomes (exports, employment and profits 
per worker) before the start year of the programme – between 1997 and 2000 – it can be seen that 
there is different behaviour on the part of treated and non- treated firms. Figures 1(a) to 1(c) show 
pre- treatment trends behaviour for exports, employment and average standardized wage. Although 
upon first inspection the pre- treatment performance between treated and non- treated firms may look 
alike, when performing a test of equality of trends, the null hypothesis of equality is rejected.15 This 
divergent performance could be due, among other factors, to the fact that the non- beneficiaries are a 
very heterogeneous group of firms and may not constitute an accurate comparison group for treated 
firms. Analyzing the effectiveness of the programme in this context will require finding an appropri-
ate counterfactual to the beneficiary firms. This will be the first task of our identification strategy.
6 |  IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
We use the non- participating firms to estimate the counterfactual outcome of the beneficiary (treated) 
firms. However, as the previous section suggests, the pool of non- beneficiary (untreated) firms is not 
necessarily comparable to the group of beneficiaries, since getting public credit (treatment) was not 
randomly assigned, and hence potential issues of self- selection and administrative selection bias can 
arise and seriously compromise the validity of the estimations.
To avoid potential problems caused by selection bias we will use two methods: standard fixed- 
effects regressions and a combination of fixed effects with propensity score matching. If participa-
tion was determined by observable factors, these variables were included as control variables in a 
regression framework. However, some of these relevant factors are unobservable (for instance, en-
trepreneurial behaviour of the firm, manager characteristics, etc.), and thus cannot be accounted for. 
Nevertheless, the panel structure of the data allows us to eliminate all unobservable factors, as long as 
they do not vary with time, using a fixed- effects model.
More rigorously, we propose the following specification:
where Yit is the outcome of the firm i in year t, αi captures all time- constant factors that affect the 
outcome and are firm- specific, μt represents yearly shocks that affect all firms, Tit is a binary vari-
able that takes the value 1 since the year in which the firm i enters the programme, Xit is a vector of 
15Tables available upon request.
(1)Yit=αi+μt+βTit+γXit+εit
T A B L E  2  Descriptive statistics
Treated Controls t- test
Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev. T p- value
Employment 135 662 14 76 83.0 0.00
Salary expenditure (thou R$) 2,749,683 28,400,000 188,421 2,448,082 40.9 0.00
Exports (US$) 1,948,057 32,800,000 66,405 6,558,752 26.0 0.00
Imports (US$) 1,453,841 49,700,000 76,486 4,716,537 12.6 0.00
Age of the firm (years) 14.95 1.86 1.44 7.59 2113.2 0.00
Public credit (thou R$) 940 18,455 0 0 23.1 0.00
Profits per worker (thou R$) 0.04 0.51 −0.08 0.68 92.1 0.00
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F I G U R E  1  Outcomes over time (before matching) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
(a)  Employment in logs (before matching) 
(b)  Exports in logs (before matching)
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time- varying control variables, and εit is the usual error term assumed to be uncorrelated with Tit. The 
standard errors will be clustered at the firm level for the inference to be robust to within- firm correla-
tion of the error terms. In absence of time- varying unobserved factors that affect both the outcome 
and the participation, the fixed- effects method leads to consistent estimator for β, the impact of the 
programme.
The validity of the difference- in- differences (fixed- effects) estimator rests on the identification 
assumption that trends in the outcomes would have been equal in absence of the treatment. However, 
this assumption may be difficult to accept when firms in the control group show different charac-
teristics from participating firms. This is based on the idea that dissimilar firms are likely to follow 
different trends. In order to reinforce the results, we also run equation (1) on a matched sample, se-
lecting among those firms in the comparison group that are more similar to beneficiaries, not only in 
terms of observed characteristics but also on their pre- treatment performance. By doing so, we ensure 
selection from the control group of only those firms with similar pre- treatment trends to those in the 
treated group.
More specifically, we define the previous year to treatment as a baseline year and estimate the 
conditional probability of participation, using a probit model:
for a fixed pre- treatment year t, where Z is a vector of covariates, Yl is a vector of k lags of 
the outcome variable, (Yit - 1, …Yit - k), and Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function.
The main argument to match firms is to ensure that ex ante trends are similar between groups 
before the treatment. Thus, we use a separate probit model for each outcome. We claim that running 
separate probit models for each outcome is a more flexible strategy to find appropriate matches for 
each treated firm. Intuitively, for instance, a comparison firm may be a good match for a treated firm 
in terms of ex ante trends in exports but may follow a different dynamic in employment. Therefore, 
running separate probit models allows us to find better matches for each outcome. The main disad-
vantage of this choice is that the resulting control groups are different for each outcome, which may 
complicate the comparison of the results across outcomes. However, considering the importance of 
the parallel trends for our identification strategy and the validity of the estimations, we believe that the 
advantages of this choice outweigh its costs.
Using the predicted probability of participation, we match each treated firm with the untreated firm 
with most similar propensity score; we then drop from the database all the control group firms that are 
not matched to any treated firm and run equation (1) on this matched subsample.
7 |  ESTIMATION RESULTS
First, we will discuss the full sample results, and then we will focus on the common support estimations.
7.1 | Full sample results
This section summarizes the results obtained by estimating equation (1) using the fixed effects esti-
mator for the three outcomes of interest: employment, total exports and wage differential, our proxy 
for labour productivity. The participation variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 once the firm 
started participating in the public credit programme and 0 otherwise.
(2)P
(
Tit=1|Zit,Ylit
)
=Φ
(
θZit+λY
l
it
)
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Table 3 shows the impact of the programme on employment. Column 1 shows that, relative to the 
control group, the employment level of the beneficiary firms increased by 23% when only controlling 
for time dummies.16 Columns 2 and 3 show how this impact is robust to the inclusion of control vari-
ables and industry- year effects allowing for differential time trends across industry sectors. Thus, after 
controlling for observables, relative to the control group, the employment level of beneficiary firms 
increases by about 25%. When interpreting these impacts we are taking into account the trajectories of 
the control and the treated group throughout the period of analysis. At the baseline, the matched sam-
ple of treated firms exhibit on average 100 employees per firm, hence a 23% increase implies an in-
crease of 23 employees for the treated firms with respect to the control group.
Table 4 shows the impact of the programme on exports. The estimates show evidence of large 
impacts in all three specifications. Column 1 reveals a strongly significant positive impact of 47% 
on exports when controlling for time dummies. The estimated impact decreases after the addition 
of control variables, but remains large and significant (39%). This effect is robust to the inclusion of 
industry- year interaction terms.
16More precisely, since the treatment variable is binary and the outcome is measured in logarithms, the correct way to interpret 
the coefficient is to calculate exp(b)- 1. However, the ‘raw’ coefficient is in most cases a very close approximation to the discrete 
impact, and hence we use what we consider the more straightforward way of interpreting the results.
T A B L E  3  Effects on employment (full sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Public credit 0.2307*** 0.2531*** 0.2528***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
Age (in logs) 0.8756*** 0.8762***
(0.016) (0.016)
Years of schooling (in logs) 0.1333*** 0.1322***
(0.008) (0.008)
Average wage (in logs) 0.1011*** 0.1016***
(0.007) (0.007)
Patents (number) 0.0055 0.0060
(0.004) (0.004)
Export good premium (dummy) 0.1338*** 0.1334***
(0.008) (0.008)
Imports (in logs) 0.0212*** 0.0211***
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 2.2865*** −0.8945*** −0.9151***
(0.002) (0.060) (0.060)
Fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓
Time dummies ✓ ✓ ✓
Industry-year interactions ✘ ✘ ✓
R2 0.02 0.071 0.073
Obs. 492,480 492,480 492,480
No. of firms 49,248 49,248 49,248
Cluster- robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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Table 5 shows the impact of the programme on labour wage differential. According to the first set 
of estimations, none of the specifications detect a significant impact. This lack of impact might seem 
counterintuitive. However, a word of explanation is needed here. On the one hand, it is not theoretically 
clear that a positive effect is expected. For instance, Bustos’ (2011) theoretical model argues that if 
credit lowers the marginal cost of the less productive technology (BNDES funds are mostly earmarked 
for domestic equipment purchases) more firms will adopt it and the aggregate productivity – proxy by 
the wage differential – may not increase. On the other hand, there could be a measurement problem. 
After all, this is a proxy that might not be capturing the entire dynamics of the firms, since wages 
may change more slowly than real labour productivity. Furthermore, our results are consistent with 
Ottaviano and Lage de Souza (2008) who find no overall effect of BNDES loans on TFP. Based on 
the PIA database, these authors suggest some association with productivity, but no causality is found.
7.2 | Construction of the matched sample
Since beneficiary firms are not a random sample of the population, self- selection and administrative 
selection bias can arise (after all, BNDES loan application and selection depend on firm characteris-
tics) and compromise the validity of our previous estimations. Thus, the evidence presented could be 
T A B L E  4  Effects on exports (full sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Public credit 0.4765*** 0.3880*** 0.3896***
(0.095) (0.080) (0.080)
Age (in logs) 0.0449 0.0434
(0.038) (0.039)
Years of schooling (in logs) 0.0347*** 0.0338***
(0.012) (0.012)
Average wage (in logs) 0.0395*** 0.0399***
(0.010) (0.010)
Patents (number) −0.0082 −0.0075
(0.017) (0.017)
Export good premium (dummy) 5.8490*** 5.8482***
(0.064) (0.064)
Imports (in logs) 0.0717*** 0.0717***
(0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.7106*** −0.1515 −0.1544
(0.007) (0.115) (0.115)
Fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓
Time dummies ✓ ✓ ✓
Industry-year interactions ✘ ✘ ✓
R2 0.02 0.297 0.30
Obs. 492,480 492,480 492,480
No. of firms 49,248 49,248 49,248
Cluster- robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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biased since we are not constructing a formal comparable counterfactual. We could even argue that 
the control group is very heterogeneous and thus not necessarily comparable to the treated firms. To 
reinforce the validity of the results, we will proceed to select – from the control group – those firms 
with similar observable characteristics to the treated firms. For this purpose, we use a matching meth-
odology to pair each treated firm to the most similar untreated firm. Based on our data, we proceed 
in three steps. First, we estimate a probit model for the conditional probability of participation for 
each firm using a vector of observed characteristics as predictors. Second, we match each beneficiary 
with an untreated firm with the closest propensity score. Finally, we estimate equation (1) on the 
new matched sample, dropping all the untreated firms that are never used for comparison. The probit 
model is estimated one year before the treatment starts to ensure that none of the predictors are af-
fected by the intervention. In addition to standard control variables – such as age and industry sector 
– we also include several lags of the outcome variable not only to match observable characteristics but 
also to ensure that treated and control firms followed similar pre- treatment paths. As described in the 
methodological section, this is a necessary condition for the difference- in- difference (fixed effects) 
estimator to be consistent. In particular, we estimate three different probit participation models to per-
form separate analyses for each outcome. In each one of these, we use four lags of the corresponding 
outcome variable to capture pre- treatment trends, plus a set of control variables.
T A B L E  5  Effects on wage differential (full sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Public credit −0.00002 0.0011 0.0016
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
Age (in logs) −0.1056*** −0.1079***
(0.013) (0.013)
Years of schooling (in logs) 0.0004 0.0004
(0.009) (0.009)
Average wage (in logs) 0.6521*** 0.6522***
(0.020) (0.020)
Patents (number) −0.0006 −0.0006
(0.002) (0.002)
Export good premium (dummy) −0.0147** −0.0147**
(0.006) (0.006)
Imports (in logs) −0.0048*** −0.0048***
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant −0.0403*** −4.4089*** −4.4116***
(0.002) (0.132) (0.132)
Fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓
Time dummies ✓ ✓ ✓
Industry-year interactions ✘ ✘ ✓
R2 0.007 0.255 0.255
Obs. 492,480 492,480 492,480
No. of firms 49,248 49,248 49,248
Cluster- robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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The results of the probit models for 2001 are presented in Table 6. The dependent variable is di-
chotomous and takes the value of one if the firm borrowed from either BNDES or FINEP in 2001. 
From each individual probit model, we conclude that the more mature firms with the most skilled 
employees and the highest wage expenditures have a higher probability of participating in the public 
credit programme. Interestingly, small firms have a higher participation probability compared to the 
largest firms. This information is consistent with the summary statistics described above and gives 
T A B L E  6  Participation model
Ln(employment) Ln(exports) wage differential
Yit−1 0.45*** 0.025*** 0.01
(0.061) (0.008) (0.05)
Yit−2 −0.14* 0.005 −0.021
(0.08) (0.009) (0.056)
Yit−3 0.043 0.01 −0.005
(0.07) (0.009) (0.058)
Yit−4 −0.053 −0.017** 0.023
(0.039) (0.008) (0.045)
Age (in logs) −0.173*** −0.109*** −0.103***
(0.044) (0.036) (0.036)
Years of schooling (in logs) 0.258*** 0.193*** 0.185***
(0.073) (0.071) (0.07)
Average wage (in logs) 0.134*** 0.173*** 0.177***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.052)
Multinational (dummy) −0.553*** −0.63*** −0.578***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Patents (number) 0.039 0.059* 0.058*
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
Export good premium (dummy) 0.154*** 0.072 0.219***
(0.059) (0.067) (0.06)
Imports (in logs) 0.02*** 0.027*** 0.031***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Size of the firm (micro) 0.117 −1.117*** −1.089***
(0.173) (0.145) (0.078)
Size of the firm (small) 0.329** −0.491*** −0.456***
(0.148) (0.136) (0.062)
Size of the firm (medium) 0.239* −0.097 0.161
(0.134) (0.132) (0.13)
Constant −4.279*** −3.133*** −3.003***
(0.34) (0.324) (0.344)
Pseudo R2 0.123 0.1035 0.1001
Obs. 49,248 49,248 49,242
Regressions control for geographical and industry dummies
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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F I G U R E  2  Outcomes over time (after matching) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
(a)  Employment in logs (matched sample)
(b)  Exports in logs (matched sample)
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evidence of a participation bias. In other words, we need to control for this selection bias to be able 
to attribute the difference in outcomes between treated and non- treated firms to the programme. If 
we were to leave this issue unattained, the difference in outcomes may be given by the pre- treatment 
difference between treated and non- treated.
Using the probit models estimates, we compute the predicted probability of participation and 
match each beneficiary with the non- beneficiary (with the closest propensity score). We construct this 
control group using the one- nearest- neighbour algorithm. Finally, we drop from our sample all the 
control firms that are not matched to any treated firm. Appendix 2 shows the balancing test for the co-
variates included in each participation equation considering a control group defined by the matching 
procedure. Figures 2(a) to 2(c) show the three outcomes of interest for treated and control firms after 
the matching procedure.
As expected, after the matching procedure, the hypothesis of equality of means of observable char-
acteristics for both treated and untreated firms cannot be rejected. In sum, both the graphical evidence 
and the statistical tests suggest that the matching is successful in constructing a control group that is 
very similar to the treated group. Once these characteristics (including the pre- treatment trends) be-
tween participating and non- participating firms are balanced, the implicitly defined common support 
is free from selection bias and we can thus attribute the difference to the program participation. The 
final step is to estimate specification (1) in this new matched sample, the common support.
7.3 | Matched sample results
Tables 7 to 9 present the results of the estimation over the common support. Interestingly enough, the 
results for the matched sample are very similar to the ones for the full sample. More specifically, we 
find that relative to the control group, beneficiary firms increased their employment and value of total 
exports by 24% and 40%, respectively, while we find no significant impact on average wage differential.
An interesting effect could be behind the analysis for exports. In fact, our export estimates could be 
mixing two distinct possible effects: on the one hand, the programme may increase total export vol-
umes, but on the other hand it could also change the pool of exporting firms by inducing firms (that 
were not exporters) to start exporting. To address this issue, we perform two separate analyses. First, 
we study the impact of the programme on the probability of a firm being an exporter, using as the 
outcome of interest a binary variable that takes the value one when the firm has non- zero exports. To 
estimate this specification, we use a linear probability model. Such a model has some limitations with 
respect to its close- related probit or logit, mainly the fact that marginal effects are constant.17 However, 
it has the advantage of controlling for fixed effects. The results of these estimations are presented in 
Table 10.
It can be argued that an increase in the probability of exporting – that is, firms that move from 
non- exporter to exporter – would be evidence of firms that were able to overcome credit constraints 
and gain access to financial markets. In other words, the most productive firms are those that ben-
efitted from the programme and increased their productivity by getting access to financial markets. 
Interestingly enough, as Table 10 shows, we find no significant impact on the probability of exporting. 
This finding suggests that the positive impact found in the previous estimations is mainly driven by 
the increase in total export volumes among firms that were already exporting. To further test this hy-
pothesis, we then analyze the effect of the public credit programme on export volumes by restricting 
the sample to firms that were (already) exporters two years previous to treatment. These results are 
17Another drawback of the linear probability model is that it does not guarantee that the predicted probability to be between zero 
and one, although this is irrelevant in this case where the estimates are not used for prediction.
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presented in Table 11. The findings reveal very large and significant impacts: relative to the control 
group and among exporting firms, beneficiaries doubled their total exports value. These estimates 
support the hypothesis that the effect on exports is almost entirely driven by the increase in export 
volumes among exporting firms, while not affecting the probability of becoming an exporter.
Overall, the results for the matched sample confirm our previous findings; we find positive and 
large impacts of the public credit policy on employment and total exports. Interestingly, the impact 
on exports is driven by the increase in export volumes among exporting firms and not by changes in 
the pool of exporting firms. In the case of our measure of proxy for productivity – wage differential – 
results do not show any significant impact.
We now carefully analyze the dynamic pattern of the effects of the public credit programme. In 
other words, the interest is to disentangle the effects of the programme to understand how they vary 
over time. We modify our econometric specification by replacing the treatment variable with a dummy 
variable Dit that takes the value 1 in the first year of treatment and 0 otherwise. We will also use sev-
eral lags of this variable, Dit-k, to indicate the impact of the intervention in the k-th year of treatment. 
Table 12 shows the results for the three outcomes of interest.
We find that the impact on employment is always significant and increases over time, from a 
magnitude of about 14% in the first year after the treatment up to 32% after six years of treatment. 
T A B L E  7  Effects on employment (matched sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Public credit 0.2462*** 0.2404*** 0.2395***
(0.029) (0.026) (0.026)
Age (in logs) 1.1563*** 1.1577***
(0.090) (0.091)
Years of schooling (in logs) 0.0186 0.0201
(0.075) (0.075)
Average wage (in logs) −0.0197 −0.0229
(0.088) (0.087)
Patents (number) 0.0049 0.0061
(0.010) (0.010)
Export good premium (dummy) 0.1085*** 0.1076***
(0.027) (0.027)
Imports (in logs) 0.0262*** 0.0262***
(0.004) (0.004)
Constant 3.1698*** 0.1734 0.1944
(0.014) (0.611) (0.604)
Fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓
Time dummies ✓ ✓ ✓
Industry-year interactions ✘ ✘ ✓
R2 0.09 0.171 0.176
Obs. 15,700 15,700 15,700
No. of firms 1,570 1,570 1,570
Cluster- robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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Figure 3(a) shows these effects and their corresponding standard errors. Our findings show a strong 
and significant positive trend effect of the public credit programme.
In the case of total exports, the impact clearly increases over time, but it takes more time to mate-
rialize. In the first year, the positive estimate is not significant, but immediately becomes significant 
after the second year of the programme. Figure 3(b) shows that the dynamic impact exhibits an in-
verted U- shape, increasing during most of the years but slightly decreasing in the last one suggesting 
the existence of an optimal duration of the treatment. Consistent with our previous results, wage 
differential does not exhibit any significant dynamic pattern. The third column of Table 12 shows that 
none of the estimates associated with the treatment are significant.
8 |  CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our study contributes to the growing debate on the role of public credit programmes and state- 
owned development banks in promoting the performances of firms. In particular, our article sheds 
light on the effectiveness of public credit programmes in Brazil by using a unique micro- level panel 
data set compiled by the IPEA, which includes information on both firm- level performances and 
T A B L E  8  Effects on exports (matched sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Public credit 0.5358*** 0.4060*** 0.3979***
(0.119) (0.102) (0.102)
Age (in logs) 0.0073 −0.0014
(0.309) (0.312)
Years of schooling (in logs) −0.1072 −0.1191
(0.184) (0.184)
Average wage (in logs) 0.2976* 0.2987*
(0.159) (0.160)
Patents (number) 0.0931 0.0975
(0.076) (0.075)
Export good premium (dummy) 4.4198*** 4.4214***
(0.213) (0.212)
Imports (in logs) 0.0913*** 0.0912***
(0.015) (0.014)
Constant 2.4279*** −0.1550 −0.0874
(0.060) (1.374) (1.373)
Fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓
Time dummies ✓ ✓ ✓
Industry-year interactions ✘ ✘ ✓
R2 0.01 0.208 0.21
Obs. 15,800 15,800 15,800
No. of firms 1,580 1,580 1,580
Cluster- robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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access to public credit lines for more than 231,000 firms. We focus on the impact of the credit lines 
managed by BNDES and FINEP in fostering employment, labour productivity and export labour. 
We find that access to public credit lines has a significant and robust positive impact on employ-
ment and exports, while we do not find evidence of a significant effect on wage differential, our 
proxy for productivity. Interestingly enough, our findings show that the impact on exports is mainly 
driven by the increase in export volumes among exporting firms, while we do not find a significant 
effect on the probability of becoming an exporter. These results suggest that the analyzed public 
credit programmes effectively foster firms’ growth and helped exporters maintain and increase their 
operations. However, we do not find conclusive evidence of productivity gains. These results are 
consistent with Ottaviano and Lage de Souza (2008) who find no overall effect of BNDES Finem 
loans on TFP. Based on the PIA database, these authors suggest some association with productivity, 
but no causality is found.
Nevertheless, some caution is probably needed when interpreting this lack of effect on productivity 
– for example, the result may be driven by the specific indicator we are using rather than being due to 
a real lack of impact. In fact, one would expect a simultaneous increase of export and employment to 
be accompanied by improvements in productivity. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, we cannot 
compute a standard measure of productivity based on the RAIS database. For that purpose, the PIA 
T A B L E  9  Effects on wage differential (matched sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Public credit −0.0054 −0.0063 −0.0067
(0.015) (0.012) (0.012)
Age (in logs) −0.1051* −0.1082*
(0.056) (0.056)
Years of schooling (in logs) 0.1374*** 0.1367***
(0.051) (0.051)
Average wage (in logs) 0.8182*** 0.8186***
(0.143) (0.143)
Patents (number) −0.0089 −0.0084
(0.009) (0.009)
Export good premium (dummy) −0.0275 −0.0276
(0.019) (0.019)
Imports (in logs) −0.0057** −0.0058**
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.0708*** −5.3923*** −5.3580***
(0.014) (0.838) (0.838)
Fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓
Time dummies ✓ ✓ ✓
Industry-year interactions ✘ ✘ ✓
R2 0.009 0.323 0.324
Obs. 15,790 15,790 15,790
No. of firms 1,579 1,579 1,579
Cluster- robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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from IBGE should be used with the consequent loss of observations. This is certainly a task for future 
research provided that new and better data become available.
Our study finds a positive effect of the public credit policy effect of BNDES and FINEP which 
could be seen as running contrary to Lazzarini et al. (2015). However, care needs to be taken when 
comparing both studies, since Lazzarini et al. (2015) analyze different outcomes and, most impor-
tantly, have a smaller sample size with larger firms. They conclude that BNDES’s loans and equity 
allocation do not have a consistent effect on profitability, market valuation or investment decisions, 
but they focus on a sample of firms (traded on the stock exchange) which tend to be larger and less 
financially constrained than the overall population of firms receiving BNDES loans.
Because of the relevance and size of the state- owned banks in Brazil, our findings offer a valuable 
contribution to the debate on which policy instruments should be used to support the development of 
a competitive productive system in emerging countries. Sound and wide access to credit has always 
been considered a key ingredient of any private sector development strategy. Our results show that 
the provision of credit through public programmes in Brazil plays a significant role in making credit 
available for firms and effectively improves firms’ competitiveness, particularly when measured in 
terms of volume of exports. Our results should also be interpreted within the context of our period of 
analysis: 2000 to 2007.
T A B L E  1 0  Impact on the probability of exporting (matched sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Public credit 0.0197* 0.0108 0.0112
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Age (in logs) −0.0007 −0.0015
(0.027) (0.027)
Years of schooling (in logs) −0.0112 −0.0120
(0.017) (0.017)
Average wage (in logs) 0.0144 0.0147
(0.011) (0.011)
Patents (number) 0.0038 0.0045
(0.004) (0.004)
Export good premium (dummy) 0.4506*** 0.4510***
(0.019) (0.019)
Imports (in logs) 0.0068*** 0.0068***
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.1984*** 0.0690 0.0702
(0.006) (0.114) (0.114)
Fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓
Time dummies ✓ ✓ ✓
Industry-year interactions ✘ ✘ ✓
R2 0.005 0.224 0.227
Obs. 15,830 15,830 15,830
No. of firms 1,583 1,583 1,583
Cluster- robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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This article also contributes to the production of evidence on the effectiveness of programmes 
aimed at supporting firm- level performances. In particular, the data setting not only allows us to 
reduce selection bias by controlling for firm- level fixed effects, but also improves the credibility of 
the difference- in- difference assumption by matching treated and control groups on the pre- treatment 
trends of the outcome variables. Because administrative datasets with similar characteristics to the one 
we used are becoming available, our estimation strategy contributes to the methodological discussion.
Our contribution spurs new avenues of potential research. First, as suggested above, since a 
standard measure of productivity could not be computed given the dataset used in this article, a 
natural extension is the inclusion of such a measure. Under special circumstances, firm- level data 
for the manufacturing sector are available in Brazil. Second, future research should also expand the 
analysis beyond average treatment effects. If more detailed information about the characteristics of 
the credit lines becomes available, the analysis could include the heterogeneous effects that access 
to public credit lines may have in terms of loan terms, targeted firms’ populations and other specific 
requirements of the credit lines. A third avenue of potential research comprises improving our un-
derstanding of the relationship between credit conditions and firm performance. This would allow 
controlling not only by firm- level pre- treatment economic performances (which under reasonable 
T A B L E  1 1  Impact on the quantity exported (matched sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Public credit 1.1504*** 1.0086*** 1.0073***
(0.374) (0.338) (0.338)
Age (in logs) −1.1934 −1.0868
(1.449) (1.458)
Years of schooling (in logs) 0.3043 0.4070
(0.995) (0.991)
Average wage (in logs) 0.9161** 0.8149*
(0.434) (0.424)
Patents (number) −0.0376 −0.0430
(0.094) (0.090)
Export good premium (dummy) 2.5402*** 2.5346***
(0.221) (0.219)
Imports (in logs) 0.1336*** 0.1358***
(0.032) (0.032)
Constant 11.0240*** 2.8974 2.8140
(0.207) (5.797) (5.818)
Fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓
Time dummies ✓ ✓ ✓
Industry-year interactions ✘ ✘ ✓
R2 0.057 0.190 0.200
Obs. 3,140 3,140 3,140
No. of firms 314 314 314
Cluster- robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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assumptions could be consider a good proxy of a firm’s financial health), but also by firm- level 
financial characteristics.
T A B L E  1 2  Dynamic effects (matched sample)
Ln(employment) Ln(exports) wage differential
Dt 0.1373*** 0.1191 0.0016
(0.019) (0.117) (0.014)
Dt−1 0.1838*** 0.3923*** −0.0089
(0.024) (0.119) (0.013)
Dt−2 0.2201*** 0.4076*** −0.0123
(0.027) (0.127) (0.013)
Dt−3 0.2774*** 0.5646*** −0.0095
(0.031) (0.140) (0.015)
Dt−4 0.2971*** 0.5262*** 0.0084
(0.036) (0.140) (0.018)
Dt−5 0.3227*** 0.3787*** −0.0198
(0.042) (0.140) (0.026)
Age (in logs) 1.1604*** 0.0015 −0.1083*
(0.091) (0.312) (0.056)
Years of schooling (in logs) 0.0175 −0.1267 0.1370***
(0.075) (0.184) (0.051)
Average wage (in logs) −0.0256 0.2955* 0.8188***
(0.087) (0.159) (0.143)
Patents (number) 0.0063 0.0991 −0.0085
(0.009) (0.074) (0.009)
Export good premium (dummy) 0.1079*** 4.4214*** −0.0275
(0.027) (0.212) (0.019)
Imports (in logs) 0.0261*** 0.0914*** −0.0058**
(0.004) (0.014) (0.003)
Constant 0.2139 −0.0555 −5.3758***
(0.605) (1.370) (0.839)
Fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓
Time dummies ✓ ✓ ✓
Industry-year interactions ✓ ✓ ✓
R2 0.18 0.211 0.324
Obs. 15,700 15,800 15,790
No. of firms 1,570 1,580 1,579
Cluster- robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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